Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

Midvale Motors, Inc., a Utah Corporation v. Melvin
J. Saunders and Wanda Talbot Saunders, His Wife,
et al. : Appellant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent; Attorneys for
AppellantRobert M. McRae; Attorney Pro Se
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Midvale Motors v. Saunders, No. 11146 (Utah Supreme Court, 1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/74

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MIDVALE MOTORS, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
11146

vs.
MELVIN J. SAUNDERS and WANDA
TALBOT SAUNDERS, his wife, et al.,
Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, in favor of
Robert M. McRae, not a party to this action, and
against the Plaintiff, Midvale Motors, Inc.
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MIDVALE MOTORS, INC., a Utah corpora- 'I
ti on,
Plaintiff and Appelbnt,
Case No.
11146

vs.

MELVIN J. SAUNDERS and WANDA
TALBOT SAUNDERS, his wife, et al.,
Defendants.

J

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment order
dated November 30th, 1967, in which the respondent, Robert M. McRae, received a judgment for a
total sum of $881.76 representing attorney's fees for
certain services performed by the said Robert M.
McRae and for costs advanced by him in handling
certain work for Midvale Motors, Inc., the appellant
in this case. In addition to fixing the above named
amount for attorney's fees and costs, the judgment
order of November 30th, 1967 fixed a judgment lien
on the file and real property which is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's cause of action.
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DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
On October 23rd, 1967, pursuant to a motion o'
Robert M. McRae, the former attorney of appellant
herein, an order was entered giving permission
the said Rebe+ M. McRae to withdraw as counst:
of record for the plaintiff corporation, and further
fixing attorney's fees for services performed by the
said Robert M. McRae in the sum of $750.00 and in
addition the sum of $134.76 was awarded to the sak
Robert M. McRae for costs advanced in connectior.
with the prosecution of the said case. A further pro
vision of the order placed an attorney's fee lien on
the files and property which is the subject of th1s
action.
Thereafter, on November 29th, 1967, pursuant
to plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the order, a hearin0
was held in which the plaintiff attempted to have the
order set aside pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Pre
cedure, Rule 60 (b) (1) and (7), in which the plaintili
alleged that to its knowledge it did not receive c :
notice of the Motion for Determining Attorney's fee 0 ,
although admittedly the file purports that a copy !
the said notice was mailed to the plaintiff. At the'. i
hearing the motion of the plaintiff was denied anc ·
a judgment order was entered on the 30th dc:y 0 i
November, 1967 reitirating the previous order tha
had been entered awarding the sum of $881.76 ~,:I
'·I
the said Robert M. McRae representing attorneY
fees and costs advanced to prosecute this action.
1

0

!

1

Thereafter. the plaintiff filed Objections to Fino
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--3
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Motion to

Vacate the Judgment. The sa.id Motion to Vacate
Judqment was heard on the 29th day of December,
1967 and the plaintiff's motion was denied. Plaintiff
appeals from the said judqment order entered on
the 30th day of November, 1967.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
order of November 30th, 1967 and the dismissal of
this action.
FACTS
On August 17th, 1965, the respondent, Robert
M. McRae, the then attorney for the appellant, Midvale Motors, Inc., filed a complaint against Melvin J.
Saunders. W anrla Talbot Saunders, his wife, and
Thomas J. Ivester. The action was brought under a_
Uniform Real Estate Contract into which the Saunders and Ivester had entered covering certain real
property in Kearns, Utah. The complaint asked for
two of the remedies available under the said Uniform Real Estate Contract, to-wit: money damages
of $100.00 per month which was the sum called for
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract as payments on
the house, plus the amount of $4.00 per month as
: late charges for delinquent payments, or a total sum
of $832.00; the complaint also sought to have the
Possession of the property turned over to the plaintiff, Midvale Motors, Inc.

1

!

In answering the complaint, the defendants
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tendered possession of the house to the plaintifi.
Thereafter. the trial court ruled that the plaintiff was
foreclosed from seeking money damages on the
theory that the tender of possession of the property
to the plaintiff had foreclosed it from seeking any o!
the alternative remedies called for in the contracl,
and that it was entitled only to possession.
The case was appealed and on appeal this
Court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to take any
of the alternative remedies up to the time of actual
trial in the matter, and that the defendants could noi
choose which of the remedies the plaintiff would
seek. The case was then remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the instructions of this
Court. Midvale Motors v. Saunders, 432 P. 2d 3/
(Utah 1967).

At that time Robert M. McRae sought to with· /
draw as counsel for the plaintiff and permission by·
the Court was given to withdraw and attorney's fees
were fixed as has been stated.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
A JUDGMENT TO THE RESPONDENT, ROBERT M. McRAE, AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF, MIDVALE MOTORS, INC., FOR THE
REASON THAT ROBERT M. McRAE IS NOT
A PARTY TO THIS ACTION.

It should be made clear from the beginning tha'
this is not a situation in which a successful plaint::: .
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goes to court for the fixing of reasonable attorney's
fees to be collected from an unsuccessful defendant
in accordance with the provisions of a contract calling for the defendant to pay attorney's fees if a court
action is necessary in order to enforce that contrnct.
This is a situation in which an attorney has, by motion, had the amount of attorney's fees to be collected from his own client fixed by the Court. Under
such a procedure there is no opportunity for the
client to object to the amount of attorney's fees and
if he feels that the amount is excessive have a fact
determination before a trial of fact as to the reasonable amount of the said attorney's fees.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3,
states:
"A civil action is comr,rnnced (1) by filing a complaint with the Court, or (2) by the service of a
summons."

In this class the respondent, Robert M. McRae, now
has a judgment against his own client without ever
having gone to the bother of sending to his client
a statement of the amount of money owing and due
for his services and if the client objects, suing the
client in a court of law in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the hearing held on the 29th day of November, 1967, pursuant to plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside
Order, the attorney for the plaintiff moved the court
for a dismissal of this action on the basis that it was
not brought in accordance with the Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure. For some reason the motion of thio
plaintiff was not recorded in the transcript, and pagio
9 of the transcript states: "Further arguments ol
counsel not recorded." Appellant does not know ths
reason for ihe omission of this part of the record bu:
wishes this motion of the appellant before the courl
as part of said :2cord.
It is therefore maintained by the appellant thal
the procedure by which Mr. McRae has obtained a
judgment against his own client for attorney's fees
is not in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civ !
Procedure, and that the case should be dismissed
on that basis, and if Mr. McRae then wishes to bill
his former client for the amount he claims is the
reasonable value of his services, he may do so, and
may also, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, file an action by serving a summonsand
complaint upon the plaintiff for the amount he
claims, should the plaintiff fail to pay the same.
1

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
A JUDGMENT TO ROBERT M. McRAE
WHEN THE PARTIES HAD STIPULATED
THAT THE PRIOR ORDER COULD BE SET
ASIDE AND MR. McRAE OFFERED NO EVIDENCE OF THE REASONABLENESS OF HIS
CLAIMED ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The transcript of proceedings at page 9 shows
the following statement of Mr. Robert M. McRae:
"May I give a statement? Can the entire matter be
resolved at this time if the Judge is willing?" The
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findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in
lh1s matter and signed on the 30th day of November, 1967, contain the following:
"Plaintiff's present counsel, William J. Anderson,
and Robert M. McRae stipulated in open court that
the entire mGtter concerninJ the motion of Rob2rt
M. McRae and the motion of plaintiff to vacate the
order of October 23, 1967, could be heard at this
time."

Plaintiff contends that this stipulation could
hav0 no other meaning than that the matter of the
motion of Robert M. McRae to fix attorney's fees
could be heard at that time. This was, in effect, a
stipulation that the order of October 23rd, 1967,
could be set aside and that the Motion of Robert M.
McRae could then be heard at that time. It was then
the burden of Robert M. McRae to offer evidence
a.t that hearing on the matter of ~he reasonableness
of attorney's fees and to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to rebut any evidence which he may then
have offered. His failure to do so could leave the
court no other alternative but to deny Mr. McRae's
motion to fix attorney's fees. In Hatch v. Sugarhouse
Finance Company, 434 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1967), it
is stated:
"It is generally held that only a lmvyer can know
the value of legal services rendered, and it would
seem that no great inconvenience to a plaintiff lawyer would result in having- proof made in open court
as to the reasonable value of his services rendered,
for he would be subject to cross examination and
where other witnesses may offer contradictory evi-
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dence. Certainly the client must feel better if the
fee is fixed upon evidence given in court rather
than by fiat of the lawyer."

It is submitted that there is no evidence on record other than that of the hearing of October 23rd,
1967 as to the reasonable value of the services o!
Robert M. Mcflae. As has been seen above, the order entered in that hearing was set aside by stipu· ·
lation of the parties and the evidence produced by
Mr. McRae at that time has no evidentiary value cts
to the reasonable value of his services.
Therefore, it is contended by the appellant that
plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the order entered pursuant to the hearing of October 23rd, 1967, was
granted and that since Mr. McRae produced no evi·
dence at that point the judge should have ruled in
favor of the plaintiff and denied Robert M. McRae's
Motion to Fix Attorney's Fees.

CONCLUSION
The action of Robert M. McRae to have attor·
ney's fees fixed as against his own client should be
dismissed and if Mr. McRae then wishes to bring an
action in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, he may be free to do so.
Further it is clear from the record that the Mo·
tion of the ~]aintiff to set aside the order fixing a.I
torney's fees wJ.s. by stipulation, granted, and that
the failure of Robert M. McRae to produce evidence
of the reasonable value of his services required the
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court to grant the motion of the plaintiff to set aside
the order and that Robert M. McRae's motion of October 23rd. 1967 was then and there heard and
should have been denied.
Respectfully submitted,
William J. Anderson
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke
& Vincent
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
Midvale Motors, Inc.
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